TIME: Almanac 1993/TIME Almanac 1993.iso/time/102891/1028000.000

Text File | 1992-08-28 | 9.1 KB | 187 lines

                                                                                WORLD, Page 70

MIDDLE EAST

Let the Game Begin


A peace conference has been convened, but old antagonisms and
new accusations could turn it into a diplomatic marathon --
or a bust

By LISA BEYER/JERUSALEM -- With reporting by Jamil Hamad/
Jerusalem and J.F.O. McAllister/Washington


    By Washington's reckoning, the reply card was long
overdue. But finally last week the Palestinians put their
R.S.V.P. in writing. Yes, they would attend the Middle East
peace conference organized by U.S. Secretary of State James
Baker, the first full-scale meeting between Israel and the Arabs
in almost two decades. That cleared the way for a joint
U.S.-Soviet announcement that Presidents Bush and Gorbachev
would both attend the opening of the much anticipated parley
next week in Madrid. They had already sent out formal
invitations to the parties, who had all, more or less, said yes.
Declared a plainly pleased Baker: "This is an important day."

    Officials at the White House were even more upbeat. George
Bush plans to attend the conference for one day, give an
opening speech, then depart on other business -- political
business in Houston, where he will kick off his re-election
campaign. But with the flying trip to Madrid, he can be seen as
a catalyst for the process if negotiations succeed or, if they
fail, as a man who gave peace his best shot. "This is a win-win
situation," says a senior official.

    Baker is unlikely to stick with the talks for more than a
few days. Once the dramatic photo ops are over, the substantive
negotiations are likely to be long, difficult and
unpredictable. The negotiators will be hampered by a lack of
trust and deeply tangled issues. The talks could become a great
diplomatic marathon, stretching like the SALT and START
negotiations, into years and decades. That may even be the
optimistic view. Pessimists suggest that, since the subject is
the Middle East, the whole conference could easily blow up.

    Invitations had hardly gone out before the conference
planners were blindsided by an electrifying accusation of
Israeli bad faith. In a book published this week (see following
story), investigative reporter Seymour Hersh says he was told
that Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir shared U.S. nuclear
secrets with the Soviet Union. According to two sources, Hersh
writes, Shamir supplied Moscow with information on the targeting
of American strategic missiles, which he received from Israel's
spy in Washington, Jonathan Pollard.

    A farfetched charge like that is almost impossible to
verify. If it were true, very few officials in any government
would know it, and most of those who did would consider it their
duty to cover up, obfuscate and, if necessary, lie.
Nevertheless, whether the tale is true or not, many people might
choose to believe it. The charges and countercharges to follow
could rain on the Madrid conference.

    There were other things to straighten out as well. The
Palestinians handed Baker a tentative list of their delegates,
who will attend the conference jointly with representatives from
Jordan. In a bow to Palestinian sensitivity about the implicit
Israeli veto over their delegation, Baker refused to share the
list with Shamir -- or so he said. But he assured the Israelis
that the roster contained no names they would object to. Said
an uncharacteristically trustful Shamir: "Jim Baker's word is
good enough for me." The Prime Minister said it was up to his
full Cabinet to decide finally whether Israel would attend the
talks. But at the same time, the Soviet Union announced that it
was formally restoring diplomatic ties with Israel, suspended
since the 1967 war. That was a telling sign that Shamir had made
it clear Israel would go.

    The Palestinians' participation had been even more iffy.
In the end it was their relative weakness that brought them
around. For a time it had looked possible, even probable, that
Arab-Israeli talks would take place without them. That raised
the specter of the other Arab parties, particularly Syria,
striking a separate peace with Jerusalem, as Egypt did in 1979.
"That would seal the fate of the Palestinians," said Said
Zeedani, director of the West Bank human-rights group al-Haq.

    Instead, the Palestinians will finally sit down
face-to-face with the Israelis to bargain for a measure of
self-rule. In exchange, Jerusalem hopes to settle its
43-year-old conflict with an Arab world that has refused to
grant it a permanent place in the region. In theory, they will
negotiate on the basis of the formula first spelled out in U.N.
Resolution 242: land for peace. But the Shamir government has
made it clear that it has no intention of withdrawing from any
of the disputed territory it claims as Eretz Yisrael.

    Nevertheless, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon have also agreed
to engage in this stage of bilateral talks with the Israelis,
which will start no more than four days after the formal opening
session. Ten days later, a third phase of negotiation will
begin. The Gulf Cooperation Council, representing states like
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, is expected to join in organizing
broader regional talks to resolve questions like water rights,
disarmament and protection of the environment. Only Syria has
refused to participate at the regional level.

    The Palestinians have much to gain from this historic
negotiation. Their aims are more realistic than ever before:
gone is the dream of regaining all of mandatory Palestine and
of establishing a state overnight. The Palestinians know they
must pursue their aspiration of a smaller homeland step-by-step
through negotiations. Still, they seem ill-prepared, both
technically and psychologically, for the laborious horse-trading
needed to profit from this opportunity.

    The Palestinians, unlike the other parties to the talks,
lack the resources of a foreign ministry and an intelligence
service, essential in devising negotiating positions and in
anticipating the reactions and initiatives of other parties.
Palestinian activists say a number of committees have been
formed to begin collecting material and forming ideas. Still,
concedes Ziad Abu Zayyad, editor of the Palestinian newspaper
Gesher and a possible conference delegate, "we are not prepared
enough."

    Nor is Washington much further along. The thesis
underlying Baker's dogged efforts in the region was that
convening the conference in itself would alter the parties'
attitudes about what they might be able to accomplish. The small
circle of Baker aides involved in the conference has been too
occupied getting the parties to the table to plan what happens
once they arrive. There is also the question of U.S.
representation: with Bush and Baker leaving town so quickly, who
will take over as the principal American delegate, to move along
the complex array of bilateral and multilateral talks? One name
being mentioned is Richard Armitage, who recently served as
chief negotiator on the Philippine bases, but Washington has not
decided yet.

    The Palestinians' disarray is not entirely their own
doing. At Israel's insistence, only residents of the territories
who are not connected with the Palestine Liberation
Organization will formally participate in negotiations. However,
their moves are determined by the P.L.O., whose leadership is
scattered outside the occupied lands. P.L.O. Chairman Yasser
Arafat keeps in constant telephone contact with key Palestinians
in the territories.

    The troubling fact is that many of them lack faith in the
outcome of the process. "If you ask the average Palestinian,"
says Ghassan al-Khatib, an economist and another potential
delegate, "he will say this is nonsense; Israelis don't want
peace, and the Americans are not serious about pressing them."
Those who are not merely dismissive of the conference tend to
be vehemently opposed to participation in it, and they include
the followers of the Islamic fundamentalist group Hamas as well
as the so-called rejectionist factions of the P.L.O.

    The climate of cynicism is a handicap for the Palestinian
negotiators. They lack a mandate to accept the compromises that
may be necessary for reaching a settlement. If they make
concessions to Israel, there is the possibility they will be
labeled traitors to the Palestinian cause; at worst, they risk
violence. Beneath the vibrant bougainvilleas that peep over the
wall surrounding Palestinian interlocutor Faisal Husseini's
Jerusalem home is a warning message branding him a
"surrenderist."

    The vast gap between the contending positions will become
evident as soon as the Israelis and Palestinians begin to
haggle. While the Palestinians see autonomy, a modified form of
self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as the starting point
for an eventual independent state, Shamir sees it as the most
Israel will ever concede. Somehow, someone someday will have to
devise an ingenious bridge to bring these two profound enemies
any closer. But for the first time, at least, all the inimical
parties in the Middle East have said they are ready to try.